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AGENCY THEORY AND LOAN SYNDICATIONS: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The market for syndicated loans has grown in the last two decades and is now a major source of 
funding for corporate organizations. As an important source of capital, an understanding of how 
this market operates is worth acquiring. Central to syndicated loans are the unique relationships 
that exist between the borrower, the lead arranger and the participant lenders. An analysis of 
these relationships and how these relationships affect loan syndications is also critical. The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of information asymmetries and the resulting 
agency problems on loan syndications in terms of volumes and, structure. This paper also 
explores the role of reputations of the in mitigating the agency problems associated with loan 
syndications. 
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Chapter One  
1.1 Introduction 
The market for syndicated loans has grown in recent years and is now a major source of 
funding for corporate organizations and governments. In 2010 according to the Thomson 
Reuters Syndicated Loans Review, global syndicated lending was up 50% over 2009 figures 
reaching $2.7 trillion. The syndicated lending fees were also up 38% in 2010 from the 2009 
figures totaling $8.7 billion in 2010. According to Weidner (2000), syndicated lending 
generates more underwriting revenue for the financial sector than both equity and debt 
underwriting. Despite the growing importance of syndicated loans in corporate finance and 
the fact that all companies from all spectrums utilize this type of finance, research on their 
role in finance still remains limited. 
 
A syndicated loan is a loan where two or more lenders jointly offer funds to a single 
borrowing firm. The lead arranger is mandated to form a syndicate and lend money to the 
borrower. The lead arranger negotiates the terms of the loan with the borrower and then 
recruits participants to fund part of the loan. Syndicated loans typically involve elements of 
both kinds of financing in the sense that the lead arranger screens and monitors the borrower 
in a relationship like context, and then sells part of the loan in a capital-market like setting. 
Syndicated loans are thus referred to as a hybrid of transactional and relationship banking 
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000: Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002: and Lee and Mullineaux 
2004). 
 
It is clear that in a typical syndicated lending procedure the lead arranger is situated at the 
core of the loan syndication as the participant lenders rely heavily on the lead arranger before 
and after the loan issuance (Simons 1993 and Sufi 2007). At the pricing stage of the loan 
prior to issuance, the participant banks depend on the lead arranger for evaluating the credit 
quality of the borrower. Subsequent to issuance, the monitoring and investigation of the 
borrower is delegated to the lead arranger by the participant lenders. This delegation of 
   
responsibility and reliance on the lead arranger leads to information asymmetries among 
syndicate members and potential moral hazard problem on the part of the lead arranger. This 
is because the lead arranger bears all costs attached to monitoring of the borrower but shares 
only part (i.e. to the extent of his shareholding in the syndicated loan) of the benefits 
emanating from his monitoring and investigation activities. 
Several papers have investigated the implications of information asymmetries among lenders 
on the structure of syndicated loans (Simons, 1993: Jones, Lang and Nigro, 2000: and Sufi 
2007). They find no evidence of opportunistic behavior on the part of lead arrangers. They 
however find evidence that participant lenders anticipate lead arranger moral hazard and 
force the lead arranger to retain a higher share of the loan before they can invest in the 
borrower. 
 
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives 
1.2.1 Core Research Problem 
It is clear that the structure of syndicated loans invites potential agency problems involving 
both the adverse selection, moral hazard problem and the general principal agent problem. 
The principal agent problem can arise between the lead arranger and the borrower when they 
have different objectives and attitudes towards risk. This can also arise when it becomes 
difficult and expensive for the borrower to verify that the lead arranger is acting in his best 
interests especially during the negotiation phase of the syndication. 
 
The adverse selection problem can arise when the lead arranger has a long term relationship 
with the borrower. He therefore possesses idiosyncratic information on the borrower that 
other participant lenders may not have. The lead bank can therefore syndicate these loans 
unfavorable information to the potential detriment of participant banks. Loan syndications 
can also generate the moral hazard problem as the seller has less incentive to monitor the 
borrower once a fraction of the loan has been removed from his balance sheet. This is 
   
because monitoring is a very costly exercise and once loans have been sold off, the benefits 
accrue to the buyer and not the seller. 
Agency problems cannot be avoided in syndicated loans as they are embedded in the 
structure of the syndicated loans themselves. Agency problems in loan syndications affect the 
structure of the syndicate and also the loan agreement.  It is with this thought in mind that it 
is important to discuss the impact of information asymmetries and the resulting agency 
problems on loan syndications as they have become an important source of corporate and 
project funding. 
To facilitate an empirical analysis this study employs a theoretical framework based on 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) where they develop a model that postulates that firms with 
limited public information require due diligence and monitoring by an informed lender 
before uninformed lenders invest in the firm. Under this framework the moral hazard 
problem exists for the informed lender because his monitoring and due diligence effort is 
unobservable. To ensure diligence, a lender with monitoring and due diligence 
responsibilities must retain a large financial stake in the loan as only a firm with a stake in 
the firm‟s performance exerts the necessary effort in due diligence and monitoring. 
 
1.2.2 Additional Research Objectives  
Reputation concerns by both lenders and borrowers can be used to ameliorate the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in syndicated loans. Because the loan syndications 
market is characterized by repeated interactions among players it can be assumed that, ceteris 
paribus, players will be more concerned about their long run reputations than short run gains. 
The extent to which corporate reputations of borrowers and lenders can mitigate the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in syndicated loans will be investigated in this paper. 
 
 
 
   
1.3 Chapter Outline 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the literature on loan 
syndications and the agency conflict. It also discusses the theoretical framework and the 
fundamental concepts in loan syndications. Chapter 3 discusses the data and methodology. 
Data analysis and results are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CHAPTER TWO  
2.1Background 
Syndicated loans are defined as a loan extended by a group of lenders to a single borrower. 
Though there are multiple lenders to a single loan it is fundamental to syndicated lending that the 
terms and conditions of the loan are similar for each of the lenders. The members of the 
syndicate fall into two distinct groups, namely, lead arrangers and participant lenders. These two 
distinct groups differ in two critical aspects. Firstly, participant lenders rarely negotiate with the 
borrower, keeping an “arms length” relationship with the borrower through the lead arranger. It 
is the responsibility of the lead arranger to establish and maintain a relationship with the 
borrower and to undertake the primary information collection and monitoring activities. 
Secondly, the lead arranger typically holds a higher fraction of the loan than any of the 
participant lenders. 
 
2.1.1 The History of Syndicated Loans  
The history of syndicated loans shows that they were developed in response to the prevailing 
conditions in the financial markets. Altunbas, Gadanecz and Kara (2006) provide a historical 
perspective on syndicated loans. The emergence of the Eurodollar market in the 1960s facilitated 
the growth of syndicated loans. In the 1960s the growing internationalization in banking and the 
relaxation of exchange controls by Western European countries gave rise to dynamic growth in 
financial activity and increased the free movement of capital. This gave rise to the Eurodollar 
market as banks in Europe began offering dollar loans free of United States regulatory control at 
or below the prevailing rates in the United States market. The Eurodollar market was attractive 
given that banks operating in this market were liberated from requirements to hold non-interest-
bearing reserve balances. The Eurodollar market gave rise to the Eurodollar bonds market which 
allowed international companies to issue dollar denominated bonds that would be bought by 
European and overseas branches of United States banks. The rise of Eurobonds generated 
demand for loans markets that were structured in the same way. Banks thus began to syndicate 
loans among groups of banks put together sorely for the purpose of lending to an international 
borrower. 
   
 
In the 1970s the world economy was negatively affected by rising oil prices. Political unrest in 
the Middle East resulted in a significant drop in oil output pushing oil prices. Commodity prices 
were also pushed up and this generated inflationary pressure around the world which led to 
imbalances in the balance of payments of the developing countries which are predominantly 
importers. While the non-oil exporting developing countries faced serious balance of payments 
problems, the oil exporting nations of the enjoyed high current account surpluses. This created a 
need to rechannel these surpluses to deficit nations. Banks began to syndicate medium to long 
term credit to developing nations troubled with their balance of payments deficits. 
 
In the 1980s there was an explosive growth in corporate takeovers in the United States. It was 
characterized by restructuring of assets and recapitalization of firms. A common technique used 
to achieve this was leveraged buy outs where acquirers financed their acquisitions by issuing 
debt rather than shares. This gave rise to syndicated loans as borrowed funds were used to 
finance takeovers. Also, leveraged buyouts required large amounts and posed too much risk for a 
single bank to underwrite and carry on its balance sheet. Syndicated loans provided this market 
with an efficient and liquid loan market to manage bank exposures efficiently. 
 
Finally, the development of the over the counter secondary loan market in the 1990s cemented 
the presence of syndicated loans in finance. The secondary market allowed banks to offload from 
their loan portfolios some loans to large institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds. 
Distress debt was also sold in the secondary market to institutional investors who specialized in 
risky loans. 
 
 
2.1.2 The Syndication Process 
   
The manner in which syndicated loans are raised results in the unique overall structure of 
syndicated loans. According to Godlewski and Weill (2008), the loan syndication process 
involves three stages. The first stage is the pre-mandate phase where the borrower solicits 
competitive offers from banks to arrange and manage the syndication. From the bids the 
borrower chooses the lead arranger whom it mandates to form the syndicate. The lead bank then 
negotiates a preliminary loan agreement. 
 
In the second stage termed the post mandate phase, the lead arranger begins the syndication 
process by drafting the preliminary loan contract and preparing a documentation package for the 
potential syndicate members. The lead arranger also invites the potential participants to 
participate in the syndicate. The borrower and the lead arranger jointly produce an information 
memorandum for potential participants that contain information about the borrower‟s credit 
worthiness and loan terms. The potential participants are given the opportunity to discuss the 
memorandum with the lead arranger. 
 
After the marketing of the deal the lead arranger then makes formal invitations to potential 
participants with preference being given to the participants with the largest appetite for the loan. 
The lead bank then determines loan allocations for each participant. In the event of an 
oversubscription the lead bank can scale down the allocations or the borrower can take up a 
larger loan. In the event of an under subscription the lead arranger can take up the difference if 
they have a firm commitment contract with the borrower or they can ask the borrower to change 
the terms and remarket the deal. 
 
The third stage of loan syndications is the active phase. This is where the loan becomes 
operational and lenders receive a closing fee to compensate them for credit approval. The lead 
arranger earns the arrangement fee and participant lenders may receive a participation fee for 
joining the syndicate. 
 
   
The lead arranger is at liberty to appoint other participant lenders as co-arrangers. These are 
usually appointed to perform specific tasks for the syndicate such as book running and 
documentation as depicted in figure four below.  Syndicated loan agreements have an agency 
section where the lead arranger is formally designated the duties and also provides for the lead 
arranger‟s removal under special conditions. Figure 1 shows the typical syndication process and 
the documentation involved at each stage of the syndication under the best efforts basis (not 
underwritten) and the firm commitment basis (underwritten). Figure 2 shows the resulting 
structure of the syndication process. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
FIGURE 1: The Syndication Process 
Source: The Loan Markets Association. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
FIGURE 2: The Loan Syndication Structure 
Source:Chris Droussiotis, US Loan Syndication Presentation, Fall 2010, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking. 
 
2.1.3 Loan Syndications in South Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In South Africa and Sub Saharan Africa in general, the project finance industry is increasingly 
turning to loans syndications to finance large projects. In South Africa the “Big Four” banks 
Absa, FNB, Standard Bank and Nedbank used to finance large projects single-handedly but in 
the recent past following international trends, South African banks are now sharing project 
finance loans and risks. In the last decade these “Big Four” banks have also made their presence 
felt in other developing countries in and out of the African continent. Standard Bank for 
example, has managed to secure mandates for several deals in Brazil, El Salvador and Turkey. 
The presence of development organizations such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
Development Bank of Africa, World Bank and International Finance Corporation in most loan 
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syndications in Sub Saharan Africa has shown their capacity and commitment to infrastructural 
developments. Loan syndications have created a pool of diverse skills and techniques from 
which the client is able to benefit. The quality of services offered is broadened without cost 
disadvantage given the fact that banks compete mainly in fees and rate structures. International 
banks are also taking an interest in the South African project finance market as they are clearly 
participating in the syndicated loans and offering technical advice on the syndicated loans. 
 
In Africa more and more countries are turning to syndicated loans for financing their 
development projects. This is because in international markets, most developing countries are 
considered as opaque borrowers and therefore are unable to access the bonds markets which 
require higher levels of transparency. Their lack of adequate public information on the borrower, 
poor credit ratings, poor country ratings and initiation cost considerations rules out bonds as a 
viable option for most African countries. On the continent most of the syndications are term 
loans followed by revolving facilities. The maturities of these facilities tend to follow the 
borrowers needs, market conditions and credit worthiness. The loans are moving away from the 
typical one year loans thanks to innovative structures, a prime example being the seven year gold 
forward sale of Ashanti Goldfields.  
 
The pricing structure of the Sub Saharan Africa loan syndications is based on the London Inter 
Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) floating rate of interest for US dollar denominated loans. LIBOR is 
a daily reference rate based on the interest rate at which banks borrow unsecured funds from 
other banks on the London wholesale money market. Pricing of rand denominated syndicated 
loans is based on the Johannesburg Inter Bank Agreed Rate (JIBAR), an average of the rates 
indicated by local and international banks. These rates are reset every three to six months and in 
most cases coincide with the repayments. The agency fees are charged in percentages and these 
may include costs for management participation, underwriting and commitment fees. Due to the 
increased competition in the market, lenders have reduced their all in costs to levels that do not 
always reflect the true state of the borrower. The strength of the relationship between the 
borrower and the lead arranger is also important in loan syndications. The better the relationship 
   
between a borrower and its appointed lead arranger through previous lending relationships, the 
higher the chances that the bank will play a significant role in meeting the borrower‟s financial 
needs.  
In seeking syndication mandates banks in the Sub Saharan markets rely on referrals by their own 
branches and affiliates or from direct invitations from borrowers themselves. The ensuing 
proposals consist of detailed term sheets that specify whether the syndication will be on a best 
efforts basis or underwritten. Increased competition in Africa amongst lenders has encouraged 
borrowers to request underwriting very often at little or no extra costs.  
 
The South African syndicated loans markets utilize a series of contractual documents to augment 
the information asymmetries that are inherent in the syndicated loans market. By law participant 
lenders are supposed to undertake their own due diligence on a potential borrower before 
agreeing to participate in the loan but in practice the participant lenders rely on the assessment 
provided by the lead arranger. To mitigate the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in 
the South African  and Sub Saharan Africa syndicated loans market, the market players have 
agreed that the lead arranger‟s obligation is to provide participants with reliable information and 
then the participants conduct their own due diligence exercise. An indemnity form between the 
lead arranger and the participants is signed that indemnifies the lead arranger from any litigation 
in the form of adverse selection. This motivates participant lenders to rigorously assess the 
borrower. It is also common practice in the South African syndicated loans market participant 
lenders appoint independent experts in the form of lawyers, accountants, insurers and engineers 
to assess the project and give an independent opinion on the loan. This is done at the expense of 
the borrower. The appointed independent experts have reputation concerns and are expected to 
give a true assessment to the best of their abilities. 
 
The use of a single term sheet in the South African syndicated loans market mitigates the agency 
problems associated with syndicated loans. By using one term sheet if one party does not agree 
to the terms then there is no signing off of the loan. Even if the lead arranger were to use undue 
influence to make the other participant lenders to agree to the terms it is impossible that this 
   
undue influence would work on all the lenders. A consensus amongst the lenders on the terms of 
the loan is a prerequisite before the loan becomes active and this aids in mitigating the agency 
problems. 
Figure 3 below shows the active sectors in loan syndications in Africa and the industries that 
typically receive the funds raised through loan syndications. Figure 4 below shows that in Sub 
Saharan Africa project financing and trade financing are the main uses of the funds raised 
through loan syndications. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Loan Syndications Active Countries Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: The Banker, September 2010 Edition. 
   
 
FIGURE 4: Loan Syndications Active Industries and Uses of Finance 
Source: Deal Logic, March 2010 Edition. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The manner in which syndicated loans are originated and managed raises potential agency 
problems between all parties involved. Firstly, the borrower mandates the lead arranger to act in 
his best interests and form a syndicate raising the first agency relationship. Secondly the lead 
arranger is mandated by the other participant lenders to monitor the borrower on their behalf 
raising the second agency relationship in syndicated loans. In other loan syndications the 
presence of a co lead arranger is an attempt by other syndicate members to monitor the lead 
arranger and the borrower more directly via the independent co lead arranger. All these 
relationships and potential problems that can arise from them motivate a deeper look into the 
   
effects of the agency problem on loan syndications. Central to loan syndications is the behavior 
of the lead arranger hence reputations play an important role in mitigating the challenges. 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) observes that economic organizations through which input owners 
cooperate will make better use of their comparative advantages to the extent that it facilitates the 
payment of rewards according to productivity. If rewards to productivity were random the input 
owners would have no incentive to productive effort and if rewards were negatively correlated 
with productivity then the organization would be subject to sabotage. This places two key 
demands on economic organizations namely, the need to meter input productivity and the need to 
meter rewards. Economic organizations must therefore endeavor to measure the productive 
inputs supplied by input owners and reward these inputs accordingly and this is referred to as the 
“metering problem”. The metering problem in its most successful state rewards only those 
responsible for changes in output. The challenge is that in team production, marginal products of 
cooperative team members are not directly and separably observable. Costs are incurred to 
monitor the marginal products of cooperative team members and this gives team members 
incentive to shirk on their responsibilities than when if their performance could be easily 
measured or if he did not work as a team. Market competition in practice could be used to 
monitor some team production as input owners who are not team members can offer to replace 
shirking team members in return for smaller shares of the team‟s rewards. Team members are 
constrained from shirking by the threat of replacement. 
 
 Ross (1973) defines the agency relationship as a relationship between two parties when one 
designated as an agent acts for and on behalf of another, the principal, in a particular domain of 
decision problems. He explores the problem of agency under conditions of uncertainty when 
both the agent and principal are utility maximizers. The agent is also assumed to possess better 
information about the state of the world than the principal. He concludes that without perfect 
information between the agent and the principal, an optimal solution to the principal agent 
problem cannot be obtained if the preferred remuneration that the agent requires to act in the best 
interests of the principal is not completely known to the principal. 
   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that an agency relationship exists when one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on theory behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers then it is possible that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal as he will maximize his own utilities than those of his principal. The 
principal thus has to incur costs aimed at establishing incentives for the agent that will limit 
divergences from his interests by the agent. The principal will also incur monitoring costs 
designed to limit suboptimal behavior by the agent. The principal will thus suffer a loss in 
welfare termed “residual loss” due to the divergences between him and his agent. The problem of 
inducing an agent to act in the best interests of his principal exists in all cooperative team effort. 
 
Anthony A Atkinson (1978) observes that in most agency relationships the agent is better 
informed than the principal about the possibilities facing the firm. This inherently creates a 
fundamental problem for control since most of the information relevant for the control of the 
agent‟s behavior is possessed by the agent and not the principal. Given this the principal cannot 
be sure that the agent is making decisions that are consistent with the principal‟s objectives for 
the firm. This has led to consideration of incentive devices which result in decisions being made 
by an agent which are simultaneously the best decisions from the principal‟s point of view. He 
suggests that by sharing profits which result from the agent‟s decision making, goal congruency 
between the goals of the principal and the agent can be achieved. Profit sharing can however lead 
to potential conflicts of interest in the presence of uncertainty about the returns of the firm. 
Specifically the manager can undertake safer projects with lower returns than the principal may 
deem desirable. He concludes that when responsibility and information are decentralized and in 
the presence of an incentive scheme the agent employs his superior information in a manner that 
is mutually beneficial to both the agent and the principal. 
 
Financial economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when 
decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firm‟s security holders. He 
   
notes that management is a special type of labor with a special responsibility of coordinating the 
activities of productive inputs and carrying out contracts agreed among all inputs in a firm, all of 
which is characterized as decision making. Fama (1980) observes that in the absence of some 
form of ex-post settling up for deviations from contract, managers have the incentive not to act in 
the best interests of his principals through shirking, perquisites and incompetence than is agreed 
in the contract. The managers can perceive that, on an ex-post basis they can beat the game by 
shirking or consuming more perquisites than previously agreed.   
 
The issue of moral hazard in teams was discussed by Holmstrom (1982) where he tackled the 
issue of inducing agents to supply proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions cannot 
be observed and contracted for directly. In team effort many agents were found to cheat if joint 
output is the only observable indicator of inputs. This gives rise to the free rider problem in joint 
production. The free rider problem is less severe in organizations where there is separation of 
labor and ownership than in closed organizations like partnerships. Eisenhardt (1989) notes that 
because agents cannot diversify their employment they tend to be risk averse whiles the 
principals who can diversify their investments tend to be risk neutral. This results in differing 
goals between the principal and the agent with the agent showing unwillingness to undertake 
risky projects that would otherwise maximize the welfare of his principal. 
 
Grossman and Hart (1983) develop a method for analyzing the principal- agent problem in the 
case where the agent‟s attitudes to income risk are independent of action. They broke down the 
principal‟s problem into a computation of the costs and benefits accruing to the principal when 
the agent takes a particular action. This method aids in establishing the structure of the optimal 
incentive scheme and about the determinants of the welfare loss resulting from the principal‟s 
inability to observe the agent‟s action. Their results show that a decrease in the quality of the 
principal‟s information increases welfare loss and that when there are only two outcomes the 
welfare loss increases when the agent becomes more risk averse. 
 
   
Balakrishnan and Koza (1991) present a comparison of joint ventures, market mediated contracts 
and hierarchical governance to provide trade-offs between (i) the transaction costs in writing and 
executing contracts in the intermediate product market (ii) the costs that accompany transactions 
that redistribute the ownership of assets (iii) the costs of administering hierarchies and joint 
ventures. They show that the acquisition of complementary assets (such as in joint ventures) is 
desirable to economize on the transaction costs that are associated with market mediated 
contracts for the supply of intermediate products. Asymmetric information about the quality or 
the value of the target assets causes the adverse selection problem that result in roadblocks to a 
complete transfer of ownership rights. Joint ventures mitigate this problem as it avoids a terminal 
transaction that transfers ownership rights and allows piecemeal and continuous reassessment of 
the individual contributions to the venture. Their results show that shareholders of parent 
companies are favorably disposed towards joint ventures than acquisitions when parent 
companies are less informed about each other‟s business. With potential adverse selection 
problem complete acquisition will be more costly than a joint venture. 
 
Dahlstrom and Ingram (2003) assess the agency theory as situations in which one party (i.e. the 
principal) seeks to establish an exchange relationship with another party (i.e. the agent) to 
perform some organizational tasks on the principal‟s behalf. They acknowledge that the 
principals and agents pursue co-operative relationships yet they have differing goals and attitudes 
towards risk. They illustrate how examination of an agent‟s network of relationships influences 
the principal‟s costs of reducing pre-contractual uncertainty. They suggest that in establishing 
agency relationships, one must weigh the costs associated with acquiring pre-contractual 
information against the losses associated with foregoing screening. Their findings suggest that 
the selection of trading partners based on low pre-contractual uncertainty does not ensure that 
appropriate returns are derived throughout the life of the relationship. In fact an agent‟s dense 
network of strong ties may lead to a heightened moral hazard problem for the principal. 
 
2.2.2 Loan Syndications 
   
Syndicated loans have risen in volumes in the last fifty years to become an important source of 
finance for large corporations. Altunbas, Gadanecz and Kara (2006) provides a historical 
perspective on the development of the global syndicated loans markets. He highlights that the 
rise of the syndicated loans market was facilitated by the emergence of the Eurodollar market in 
the 1960s the Balance of Payments problem of the 1970s, the US merger wave of the 1980s and 
finally the development of the secondary loans market in the 1990s.  
 
The market for syndicated loans has evolved over the years to include new participants as 
opposed to the traditional commercial banks. Nandy and Shao (2007) documented the arrival of 
institutional investors such as hedge funds, private equity funds and hybrid funds in the 
syndicated loans market and examined their impact on the syndicated loans market. Their results 
show that institutional investors participate in the syndicated loans market because it offers them 
with lucrative returns. They also report that the loans that are originated by institutional investors 
have a higher spread than the loans originated by commercial banks in the primary market. This 
additional spread is attributed to compensation given to the institutional investors for producing 
information about the borrower. Nandy and Shao (2007) also report that institutional investors 
lend to riskier borrowers and for riskier purposes compared to commercial banks, such as 
leveraged buy-outs, takeovers and recapitalizations. They also report that the supply of capital 
from institutional investors to the syndicated loans market is negatively correlated to the 
corporate risk premium. This indicates that institutional investment in the syndicated loan market 
is sensitive to alternative investment opportunities available to investors who invest their money 
with institutions such as private equity funds and hedge funds, consistent with the arguments 
made by Gompers and Lerner (2000).  
 
The decision to syndicate a loan is motivated by many factors. Diamond (1991) reports that 
borrowers shift from private sources of funding to public sources of funding as the information 
on them improves and their borrowing reputation is developed through a successful history of 
debt repayments. When a firm requires less monitoring, debt becomes more saleable to parties 
lacking idiosyncratic information on them and loan syndications become an option. Simons 
   
(1993) reports that the capital position of the agent bank is a major factor affecting loan 
syndications and suggests that banks syndicate loans to share the risk of large indivisible projects 
and to diversify loan portfolios. 
 
The market for syndicated loans was analyzed by Mullineaux & Dennis (2000) and they found 
that loan syndications are more likely when the information about a borrower becomes more 
transparent through repeated market transactions and availability of public information on the 
borrower. They also found that loan syndications are more likely as the lead arranger‟s 
reputation increases. This is acquired through repeat business between the lead arranger and 
participant lenders where the lead arranger does not exploit other participant lenders. A lead 
arranger can build reputation capital by not shirking on his responsibility of effectively 
monitoring the borrower on behalf of other team members. Longer loan maturities were also 
found to increase the likelihood of loan syndications as they minimize the duplicative monitoring 
costs for the banks. 
 
Mullineaux & Dennis (2000) went on further to analyze the factors that motivate loan 
syndications and found that capital regulations play an important part in the syndication decision. 
Authorities typically limit the maximum size of any single loan to a banks equity capital and 
participants therefore use loan syndications as a method of managing debt concentration meeting 
regulatory requirements. They also found a banks liquidity position affects the syndication 
decision as banks in a tight liquidity position opting to syndicate loans. 
 
Jones, Lang and Nigro (2000) tested the effect of capital constraints, loan quality and 
information variables on a lead arranger share of the syndicated loans held in its portfolio. They 
reported that banks will retain a larger share of a syndicated loan if it has higher capital 
suggesting that capital constraints provide a significant incentive for banks to participate in the 
syndicated loan market. The level of information asymmetry between the lead bank and 
participant lenders has a significant influence on the share retained by the lead arranger, with the 
   
lead arranger retaining a higher portion of the loans with higher information asymmetries so as 
signal his commitment to due diligence and monitoring.  They also reported that lead arrangers 
generally hold a larger share of their low quality loans and that lead arrangers generally have a 
higher concentration of low quality credits in their portfolios, suggesting that lead arrangers do 
not exploit other syndicate members by syndicating more of loans with unfavorable information. 
The fact that lead arrangers have a higher concentration of low quality credits also suggests their 
desire to build strong reputations of non-exploitative behavior in syndications thus enhancing 
their reputation capital. 
 
Godlewski & Weill (2008) identified the factors that motivate a bank‟s decision to syndicate a 
loan in emerging markets. They went further to investigate the country level variables such as the 
legal environment, financial development and bank regulation to determine their role in loan 
syndications. They report that loan size is an important consideration in the decision to syndicate 
loans. The larger the loan size the more likely that loan is syndicated and this is in line with the 
diversification motive and the regulatory driven issues of loan syndications. They also report that 
loan maturities negatively affect the likelihood of syndication as it strengthens the moral hazard 
problem through higher monitoring costs incurred through repeated monitoring of the borrower. 
They report that the transparency of information plays a positive role in the decision to syndicate 
a loan as it mitigates the adverse selection problem that results from the lead arranger possessing 
superior information about the borrower than other syndicate members. 
 
On the country level specifics they report that bank concentration hampers the probability of a 
loan syndication. A concentrated industry means fewer potential participant lenders. Bank 
regulation has a positive influence on the decision to syndicate loans. Credit limits enforced by 
bank regulators have a positive influence in the decision to syndicate loans.  
 
The growth of syndicated loans has been pushed both by demand side factors and supply side 
factors. Giddy (1993) notes that borrowers are attracted to syndicated loans because they protect 
   
the borrower from undue influence by any one single lender. Syndicated loans have proved to be 
less costly than bonds in terms of originations fees Altubas & Gadanecz (2004). Godwelski and 
Weill (2008) discuss the advantages of syndicated loans to borrowers. They report that 
syndicated loans offer borrowers with great flexibility and convenience. They can be arranged 
quickly and more discreetly than public debt. They are also easier to liquidate, renegotiate and to 
cancel than debt securities. Syndicated loans also offer the advantage of raising large sums of 
money that would otherwise be raised through a series of bilateral loan agreements. They also 
protect the borrower against undue influence by any one single lender, a consequence of credit 
concentration. Lastly syndicated loans are less costly than bonds in terms of origination fees. 
 
Godwelski and Weill (2008) also discuss the advantages that syndicated loans offer to the 
lenders. They report that syndicated loans are motivated by the lenders need to diversify their 
loan portfolios. Syndicated loans also aid in controlling for excessive credit exposure to one 
borrower which is prohibited by most regulators. Lenders are also able to generate fees income 
from syndicated loans which results in the diversification of the lenders income sources. The 
presence of a well developed secondary market for syndicated loans also motivates lenders to 
participate as they offer the option to offload the loan should their financial positions change. 
Schure, Scoones and Gu (2005) notes the motive to syndicate loans as the need to control the risk 
of the credit portfolio rather than sharing the risk. Banks aim to control sector risks in their loan 
portfolios through active portfolio management through the use of syndicated loans. Banks can 
also reduce the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers in loan syndications as this function 
is served by the lead arranger (Hale, 2005). 
 
Other articles on syndicated loans focus on the rationale of having multiple co lead arrangers in a 
syndicate structure. Song (2004) finds evidence of the clientele effects in loan syndications 
where highly specialized underwriters co-manage deals in order to enhance their services in 
response to client specific needs. Das and Nanda (1999) present a model of a banking structure 
where, in equilibrium, banks involved in relationship-specific transactions tend to 
underspecialize in their skill, whereas banks involved in deal-specific transactions tend to 
   
overspecialize. In the model, syndication appears to be an efficient way to allow banks to 
specialize optimally. In other words banks act in the syndication process according to the 
competitive advantage they have in performing different administrative tasks. 
 
2.2.3 Agency Theory and Loan Syndications. 
Several authors in recent years have analyzed the effect of information asymmetries and the 
resulting agency problems on loan syndications. The information asymmetries mainly exist 
between the lead arranger and the participant lenders. According to Boot (2000), these 
information asymmetries are a direct consequence of relationship banking. He notes that the 
financial intermediation theory as developed by Diamond (1984) is primarily focused on the role 
of relationship lenders who develop close relationships with borrowers over time. This close 
proximity between banks and borrowers facilitates monitoring and screening and can overcome 
problems of asymmetric information between the two parties. Boot (2000) thus defines 
relationship banking as the provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that invests 
in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature and evaluating the 
profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time 
and across products. This brings about two critical dimensions of relationship banking namely, 
proprietary information and multiple interactions. Transaction banking on the other hand is 
viewed as an arms length financing focusing on that particular transaction rather than being 
aimed at an information intensive relationship with a customer such as public debt issues. 
 
The financing options for borrowers include many products with varying degrees of 
relationships. Syndicated loans fall between bank loans (relationship lending) and public debt 
issues (transaction lending). In syndicated loans only the lead arranger has a relationship with the 
borrower resulting in him having access to private information about the borrower. When he 
sells part of the loan to willing participants, the information asymmetries between the lead 
arranger and the other participant lenders become evident. 
   
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) investigates the market for selling commercial and industrial loans 
which previously were on non-marketable. Their study paid a special focus on the nature of the 
contract between a bank and a loan buyer. Commercial loan sales are a contract under which a 
bank sells a proportional claim to all or part of the cashflow from an individual loan to a third 
party buyer. Under the contract the third party buyer has no legal relationship with the banks‟ 
borrower leaving the third party bank to rely on the credit assessment of the originating bank. In 
this market the loan buyer has no recourse to the selling bank should a loan default occur. The 
theory of financial intermediation explains that for a bank to be motivated to continue with credit 
evaluation and monitoring the bank has to hold the loans it creates until maturity. Loan sales can 
give rise to lack of incentive to produce an efficient level of credit information and monitoring 
since it would not receive benefits from this activity. Loan buyers anticipating this lack of 
incentive value the loans lower than otherwise. 
 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) empirically detect the presence of unobservable contractual 
arrangements between banks and loan buyers which if enforceable could explain how the loan 
sales market is incentive-compatible. At times the selling banks sell only part of the loan so that 
the bank retains some incentive to maintain the loan‟s value. The greater the portion of the loan 
held by a bank, the greater will be its incentive to evaluate and monitor the borrower. Given that 
loan sales do not require the selling bank to maintain a fraction of the loan, this contract feature 
would be enforced by the market rather than legal means. Their findings show that loan sales 
would be incentive-compatible when the loan buyer can verify that the originating bank has 
effectively monitored and evaluated the borrower. This would enable the loan buyer to observe 
the bank‟s behavior, so that the potential moral hazard problem linked to loan selling can be 
avoided. Their results also show that the share of the loan sold is a decreasing function of the 
spread between the loan sale yield and LIBOR. This suggests that for certain types of loans that 
are not perfectly liquid the bank must continue to convince loan buyers of its commitment to 
monitoring the borrower by taking a share of the loan‟s risk. 
 
   
Pichler and Wilhelm(2001) apply the moral hazard problem in teams to syndicates. They report 
that the structure of syndicated loans gives powerful incentive to free ride on one another 
especially in monitoring and due diligence. Lead arrangers with implacable reputations of 
monitoring may be tempted to ride on this past performance and maintain the perception of high 
quality relationships with minimal effort to the potential detriment of other syndicate members.  
Wright and Lockett (2003) explored the structuring of syndicates in the venture capital market 
setting. The different parties in a venture capital syndicate are expected to perform different roles 
and this creates a need for a satisfactory level of cooperation between the collaborating parties if 
the objectives of the syndicate are to be achieved. To achieve this, firms employ different 
mechanisms to ensure confidence that partners will cooperate satisfactorily and this is usually 
done through control and trust mechanisms. Similar to syndicated loans the venture capital 
syndicates market is also characterized by repeated interactions and hence reputations play an 
important role. They report that a high proportion of venture capital firms act as both leads and 
non leads in different syndicates over time. The lead investors typically hold a larger equity stake 
reflecting the role of the lead in identifying the deal. The large equity stake is also used as a 
signal by the lead to show his commitment to screening and monitoring of the investment. They 
also report the non-lead members of the syndicate may suffer severe informational disadvantage 
in relation to the syndicate lead but these are mitigated through contracting arrangements 
between the lead and non-lead syndicate members. They also report that reputations play an 
important role in encouraging other parties to continue to syndicate with a venture capital firm in 
further investment rounds and in subsequent rounds. The reputation effects linked to repeat 
syndication aid in minimizing potentially opportunistic behavior by lead syndicate members with 
larger equity stakes who obtain greater access to investee information. 
 
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) examined the size and composition of commercial lending 
syndicates. They report that keeping syndicates small and more concentrated minimizes the 
adverse selection problems, enhancing the incentives to monitor. The free rider element is also 
minimized in smaller syndicates. They find that when there is little information on the borrower, 
credit risk is relatively high and when the loan is secured smaller and concentrated syndicates are 
formed. They also report that when a lead arranger constrains participant‟s resale activities a 
   
larger and more diffuse syndicate results. Consistent with the theory that longer term bank loans 
have less credit risk, a larger and more diffuse syndicates are formed for longer term loans. Lee 
and Mullineaux (2004) also report that reputable lead arrangers form larger and more diffuse 
syndicates because reputation formation and maintenance requires a large network of contacts 
and frequent repeat business. 
 
Ivashina (2005) studied the determinants of loan spreads in the syndicated loan market by 
focusing on its relationship with the syndicate structure. She notes that in loan syndications only 
the lead arranger conducts the due diligence of the client and monitors the loan after origination. 
This results in lower information production costs for the syndicate but at the same time creates 
information asymmetries between the lead arranger and the participant lenders. Her findings 
show that there is a persistent negative relationship between price and structure of the syndicate 
in terms of syndicate concentration suggesting that the agency problem can be effectively 
reduced by increasing the share retained by the lead arranger. The results also suggest that the 
price implications allow researchers to identify the type of agency problem (moral hazard vs. 
adverse selection) that dominates the market. 
 
In her analysis Ivashina (2005) brings out similarities between syndicated loans, managerial 
ownership and company performance. The share of the lead arranger can be viewed similar to 
the managerial stake in a company which can be used to align the incentives of the manager to 
those of the shareholders. She separates the analysis of agency problems in loan syndications to 
distinguish between the adverse selection and moral hazard problem. Results show that both 
problems have the same effect on the syndicate structure, that is, the larger the information 
opaqueness of the borrower the larger the share retained by the lead arranger. Using the intuition 
that on average a sole lender‟s loan to opaque borrowers is generally lower than the lead 
arranger‟s commitment in a syndicated loan to opaque borrowers, Ivashina (2005) suggests that 
the ex-ante adverse selection problem is the predominant problem in syndicated loans rather than 
ex-post monitoring of the loan. She also documents that opaque borrowers have a significantly 
   
higher cost of financing suggesting that the adverse selection problem is predominant in the 
syndicated loans market.  
 
Schenone (2005) examined whether relationship banks exploit the informational rents generated 
by their repeated lending to a firm. The interest rates that a bank charges its relationship firm are 
traced throughout the different stages of a firm‟s life. The use of interest rate trends is important 
because banks screen prospective clients and closely monitor the selected ones, thus reducing the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem in their lending activities which should lead to lower 
interest rates ceteris paribus. The findings suggest that relationship banks exploit their 
information advantage at a time in which they have the greatest opportunity to do so, but as they 
are threatened by outside competition, they start sharing the information rents with their 
borrowers. 
 
Bosch (2006) explored the impact of information asymmetry on loan spreads charged to the 
borrower in the syndicated loan market. The findings reports that the loan spreads charged to 
borrowers systematically reflects the amount of publicly available information associated with a 
borrowing firm. Investors typically demand a risk premium to hold securities with higher 
information asymmetry. They report that syndicated loans to firms without analyst coverage or 
third party certification via rating agencies face substantially higher loan spreads all things being 
equal. They also report evidence that opaque borrowers who repeatedly accessed the market 
exhibit lower loan spreads the smaller the time period since the last transaction with the same 
lead arranger. However opaque borrowers who interact with the most reputable lead arranger do 
not exhibit lower spreads, pointing to the fact that the lead arranger‟s reputation does not 
mitigate a borrower‟s information asymmetry. Borrowers who repeatedly access the market build 
reputations for themselves thereby lowering their information opaqueness. 
 
Bosch (2006) also analyzes the effect of informational asymmetries within the lending syndicate 
on loan spreads. As the monitoring and due diligence effort by the lead arranger is not 
   
observable to the participant lenders, there is an information asymmetry within the lending 
syndicate that gives rise to the agency problems between the informed lead arranger and the 
uninformed participants. These agency problems are specific to loan syndications and result in 
the additional premium charges to syndicated loans compared to bank loans. The information 
asymmetry between the informed lenders and the uniformed lenders increases with borrower 
opacity because opaque borrowers imply higher monitoring and investigations effort by the lead 
arranger. 
 
Bosch and Steffen (2006) analyze how information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders 
affect the lead arranger‟s decision to structure the syndicate. They employ the mandated 
disclosure requirements, rating agencies and stock exchange listings to measure borrower 
transparency. They show that rating agencies are the superior information providers. They report 
that lack of transparency induces an agency conflict between the lead arranger and uninformed 
participant banks as syndication reduces the monitoring incentives of the lead arranger. They 
show that the optimal share retained by the lead arranger is a function of borrower asymmetric 
information, as opaque borrowers optimally induce the lead arranger to retain a larger share of 
the loan in order to attract uninformed capital from participant banks. Similar to the findings of 
Sufi (2007) and Jones et al (2005) the lead arranger alleviates the moral hazard problem by 
adjusting its retained loan share signaling monitoring diligence to uninformed participant 
lenders. They report that both rating agencies and stock exchange listings have a major impact on 
information transparency. 
 
Sufi (2007) explored the syndicated loans market with special emphasis on how information 
asymmetry and the resulting agency problems influence the syndicate structure and the choice of 
participants.  He reports that information asymmetries shape the structure and the choice of 
participants in a manner consistent with the agency theory. Firms with limited public information 
generally require investigation and monitoring by an informed lender before any uninformed 
lender can invest in the firm. As a result Sufi 2007) finds that there exists a moral hazard 
problem in this as the informed lender‟s monitoring efforts are unobservable and to ensure 
   
monitoring and due diligence, a lender with the monitoring and investigation responsibility must 
retain a larger share of the loan as only a bank with a higher exposure will exert the necessary 
due diligence and monitoring. His results show that when a borrower requires intense monitoring 
and due diligence the lead arranger retains a larger share of the loan and forms a concentrated 
syndicate with fewer participants. He attributes this to the moral hazard problem with respect to 
the lead arranger‟s monitoring and due diligence. He also attributes this to the adverse selection 
with respect to the private information that the lead arranger may possess tempting the lead 
arranger to syndicate more of a loan with negative private information. Because participant 
lenders correctly predict this behavior the lead arranger is forced to retain a larger stake in a loan 
to signify good quality and commitment when information asymmetry is severe.  
 
With respect to the choice of participant lenders Sufi (2007) reports that when the borrower has 
limited public information in terms of financial results and credit ratings, the lead arranger 
approaches participant lenders who are closer to the borrower in terms of both geography and 
previous relationship. This is because the lead arranger will be attempting to reduce the need for 
information gathering by choosing participants that already know the borrower. His findings also 
suggest reputation build up may improve the ability for lead arrangers to syndicate loans for 
borrowers with limited information. In this case the reputation of the borrower is more important 
than that of the lead arranger as previous relationships between the borrower and a participant 
lender help mitigate the information asymmetries.  
 
Francois and Missonier-Piera (2007) analyzed the agency syndication structure with special 
emphasis on the reason why co-agents are engaged in loan syndications. Their results show that 
the presence of co-agents is in support of the specialization hypothesis that states that multiple 
co-agents arise in loan syndications to because of the different competitive advantages they have 
for performing all administrative tasks.  These banks possess these advantages because in 
equilibrium banks involved in relationship-specific transactions tend to underspecialize in their 
skills while banks that are involved in deal-specific transactions tend to overspecialize. This 
   
suggests that banks act in the syndication process according to the competitive advantage that 
they have in performing different administrative tasks. 
 
Francois and Missonier-Piera (2007) also show that the presence of co-agents is in support 
monitoring hypothesis that states that multiple co-agents arise in loan syndications to mitigate 
informational asymmetry problems as delegation of monitoring to a third party can effectively 
reduce agency conflicts Strausz (1997). According to the monitoring hypothesis since the lead 
arranger is the only bank that directly negotiates with the borrower and is usually the best 
informed bank about the financial position of the borrower, the syndication process leaves room 
for the moral hazard and adverse selection problem. The duty of co agents is to supervise the 
lead arranger and the borrower in a more direct way. The lead arranger by appointing a co-agent 
effectively delegates syndication agency to the co agent to mitigate the informational asymmetry 
between the agents and participant lenders. By getting co-agents involved in the loan they are 
able to acquire more accurate information on the borrower and they can monitor the lead 
arranger on behalf of the other members and determine whether the credit worthiness of the 
borrower is acceptable for the benefit of the syndicate. The co agents are induced to perform 
because their reputation will be at stake. Co agents also own a stake in the loan and this gives 
them incentive to closely monitor the borrower. The presence of co-agents in a syndicate can 
therefore be utilized to mitigate the adverse selection and moral hazard problem in loan 
syndication. Francois and Missonier- Piera (2007) also report that repeated contracting between 
the lead arrangers and participants and also between the co- agents and lead arranger attenuates 
the monitoring effect. 
 
Tykvova (2007) analyses loan syndications to check whether repeated relationships, thus 
reputation concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. The author shows 
that loan syndications can sometimes be impeded when a financier believes that has strong 
incentives to renege on a contract or to shirk on his responsibilities. The findings suggest that 
opportunistic behavior incurs costs because after reneging the lender loses his reputation and 
potential future profits. Even for new market entrants shirking is costly because they lose the 
   
chance to gain reputation and know how. Should the costs of reneging exceed the benefits of 
cheating, the reputation effect can compensate for the potential partners lack of information. 
 
Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) documented the changing nature of global loan markets 
from being relationship based to transaction based. They highlight that the sustainability of this 
market especially loan syndications relies on a complex network of ties between financial 
institutions. Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) examine the impact of past syndicate alliance 
relationships on future alliances based and also examine the factors that influence the importance 
of an alliance between two lenders. They report that the probability of joining a syndicate is 
positively related to past alliances between the lead bank and the participating banks. They also 
report that the probability of joining a syndicate is positively related to the reputation of the lead 
bank, the informational situation of the participant, whether  the lead and the participant are from 
the same country, past relationships between the participant and the borrower and the number of 
lenders in the syndicate. Their results show that the strength of the syndicate relationship 
between two lenders is sensitive to the reputation of the lead bank and that informationally 
opaque participating lenders have stronger relationships with lead banks. Their results also 
suggest that lenders exhibit a home bias in their syndicate alliances.  
 
Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2008) investigated how poor performance by a lead arranger as 
measured by defaults affects the lead arranger‟s future lending activity. They used defaults by 
borrowers to test whether syndication activity is affected by poor performance in a manner 
consistent with a reduction in the lead arranger‟s reputation and the moral hazard problem. They 
also used loan defaults to analyze the reaction of market participants to poor lead arranger 
performance. A lead arranger‟s reputation is defined in terms of his ability to and willingness to 
screen and monitor borrowers. They employed the reputation hypothesis to measure how the loss 
in reputation through defaults reduces the lead arranger‟s ability to attract participants and 
syndicate loans. They also employed the loss of capital hypothesis to measure the loss in 
business to a lead arranger owing to loss of capital after a borrower defaults and files for 
bankruptcy. They also employed the specialization hypothesis that measures the impact of loan 
   
defaults due to wider economic problems or problems in a geographical area or industry that 
causes a lead arranger to suffer additional loss of future business. 
Gopalan et al (2008) report that a lead arranger is less likely to syndicate loans following a 
default. This is consistent with the reputation hypothesis and the worst affected lead arrangers 
are the smaller lead arrangers as they find it difficult to raise additional capital and also their 
screening and monitoring abilities are in question. They also report an increase in the lead 
arranger‟s stake in loans following a default. This is consistent with the reputation hypothesis 
that predicts an increase in the lead arranger share of the loan following a default to compensate 
for his lower reputation and to send a stronger signal to syndicate participants of both loan 
quality and commitment to monitor. Gopalan et al (2008) also report that following a default lead 
arranger‟s switch to less opaque and less risky borrowers. They also report a reduction in 
syndication activity by a lead arranger who has suffered default and also his ability to attract 
participants. Only participants with strong relationships with the lead arranger are likely to 
participate in his syndicates following a default. 
 
Berndt and Gupta (2009) explore the new banking model of originate-to-distribute which is 
typical of syndicated loans. The shift to originate-to distribute model has implications to all 
market participants. They suggest that because of the lead arranger‟s superior information on the 
borrower, it gives rise to the adverse selection problem by selling off loans with negative private 
information. Alternatively this model can also lead to the moral hazard problem due to 
impairment in the monitoring function of banks. The effects of this originate to distribute model 
affects both the lenders and the borrowers. They report that borrowers with an active secondary 
market for their loans underperform their peers with no secondary market for their loans. This 
underperformance is stronger for smaller, high leverage and speculative borrowers because of 
severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
 
These results the authors suggest that banks retain good quality loans in their balance sheets 
while systematically selling off loans with negative private information that is unobservable to 
outsiders. They also suggest that banks also be knowingly originating low quality loans primarily 
   
to expand their origination fee income base since they know that they can sell them off in the 
secondary market. Berndt and Gupta (2009) provide another reason for the underperformance by 
firms with a secondary market for their loans. They attribute this to the moral hazard problem 
where when borrowers lose the discipline of bank monitoring are prone to making suboptimal 
investment and operating decisions which may lead to long run performance and value reduction. 
The paper suggests to regulatory authorities that banks are potentially originating-to-distribute 
lemons or due to diminished monitoring hampering the long run performance of borrowers 
which is socially undesirable. They suggest that banks retain a percentage of the loans they 
originate to limit the moral hazard and adverse selection problem. 
 
Gadanecz, Kara and Molyneux (2010) examined the effect of informational asymmetries among 
lenders on the loan price. They report that in loan syndications the price of the loan is determined 
by negotiations between the lead arranger and the participant banks, the information asymmetries 
between the lenders is reflected in the loan price. They report that when the participant banks 
have information inferiority they demand a higher loan spread to compensate for the higher risk. 
The participant banks require higher prices to hedge against any possibility of ex-post lead 
arranger moral hazard in monitoring activities. They also report that the availability of borrower 
credit rating attenuates information asymmetries and nullifies the impact of information set 
differences among arrangers and participants on loan spreads. The presence of reputable 
arrangers leads to lower spreads only for those borrowers with potentially fewer asymmetric 
information problems. Similar to the findings of (Bosch (2006) for opaque borrowers, mandating 
a reputable lead arranger facilitates accession to finance in the syndicated loan market but does 
not lower the cost of borrowing.  
 
Cai (2010) explores if the reciprocal arrangements among lead arrangers can serve as an 
effective mechanism to mitigate the agency problems in loan syndications. He reports that in the 
US lead arrangers are also participant lenders. The largest lead arrangers are typically the largest 
loan participants. This point to the fact that lenders maintain stable relationships with certain 
lenders and rotate their roles between leading and participating within the group. 
   
 
Cai (2010) suggests that these reciprocal arrangements are a mechanism that can effectively 
mitigate moral hazard by providing lead arrangers additional incentive to monitor borrowers 
through loan participation. Reciprocal participation allows them to free ride on each other‟s 
origination expertise and monitoring effort and enjoy rents from relationship lending on both 
loans as long as they both monitor their respective borrowers. The lead arrangers infer each 
other‟s monitoring effort by observing the outcomes of the loans and with their individual 
credibilities in threat, in equilibrium the lead arranger will always monitor his borrowers. Cai 
(2010) also reports that in the presence of reciprocity the agency problems in loan syndications 
are reduced as evidenced by a smaller share of the loan retained by the lead arranger. Loans with 
reciprocity also charge a lower interest rate and have a lower probability of loan default. Cai 
(2010) also reports that the reciprocity effect persists even for informationally opaque borrowers, 
smaller borrowers, and smaller loans, less reputable arrangers and less reputable borrowers. 
 
Panyagometh and Roberts(2010) explore the possibility that lead banks exploit other syndicate 
members by using the private information they have on the borrower to their advantage. They 
employ ex-post credit quality as a proxy for the private information held by the lead arranger. 
They report that, as the lead arranger acts as a delegated monitor for the participant banks, 
acquiring private information on the borrower, this information asymmetry creates the potential 
for agency problems. The nature of syndicated loans is that of repeat business and it is therefore 
more likely that in equilibrium banks emphasize their roles as certifiers of credit quality leading 
them to structure syndicates in ways that control the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. 
 
Their findings suggest that lead arrangers use their private information to build reputation as 
honest certifiers of credit quality thus controlling the conflict of interest with syndicate 
participants. Banks do not syndicate larger portions of that subsequently deteriorate in quality. In 
contrast the loans that they syndicate higher portions are subsequently upgraded as evidenced by 
the lower loan spreads and fees. Their findings also suggest that the lead bank‟s reputation can 
   
serve as an effective mechanism to mitigate the agency conflicts associated with loan 
syndications. This is evidenced by the finding that a loan is more likely to be syndicated and sold 
in larger portions when the lead arranger is reputable and gains the trust of syndicate members. 
 
Allen and Gottesman (2006) compared the informational efficiency of the equity market to the 
syndicated loans market by comparing the relationship between equity returns and the lagged 
returns on secondary market prices of syndicated bank loans. This was done to test the 
integration between the equity and syndicated loans market. They observe that firms generally 
issue several types of securities, each representing some claim on the firm‟s assets and if markets 
were efficient and frictionless, then all information about the value of the firm‟s assets would be 
reflected immediately into the prices of each of the firm‟s securities. Capital markets however 
are neither efficient nor frictionless as different markets have access to different types of firm-
specific information. This results in different levels of efficiency in the price formation process 
across markets. These market imperfections may prevent the integration of securities markets in 
incorporating all available information about the value of the firm‟s assets.   
 
They employed several hypotheses for their tests, the private information hypothesis 
hypothesizes that loan prices should reflect information before it is released publicly and only 
then incorporated into the prices of publicly held equity securities. The integrated markets 
hypothesis hypothesizes that if loan and equity markets are well integrated, then observations of 
simultaneous trading in both markets will be recorded upon the release of any information. The 
results find no evidence of the private information hypothesis, that loan markets lead equity 
markets because members of loan syndicates have access to superior private information about 
the borrowing firms. They however find strong evidence of the integrated market hypothesis and 
this is particularly true if the same financial intermediary simultaneously acts as an equity market 
maker and as a loan syndicate member. 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework and implementation 
   
The following section discusses four economic theories that are related to loan syndications.  The 
loan syndications structure invites potential agency problems amongst the participants namely 
the principal- agent problem, the moral hazard problem and the adverse selection problem. The 
nature of syndicated loans is that of repeated interactions and hence reputations play a major role 
in loan syndications, to this end a theoretical analysis and implementation of these theories is 
discussed. 
 
2.3.1 The Principal-Agent Problem 
The principal- agent theory rests on a basis in economics under which the relationship between 
the principal and the agent is defined by the contract. Under this premise the principal knows less 
than the agent about something important and their interests conflict in some way. The principal- 
agent problem thus treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. The principal- agent problem postulates 
that the goals and desires of the principal and the agent conflict and it is also difficult and 
expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem of risk sharing 
arises when the principal and the agent have differing attitudes towards risk and therefore may 
prefer different actions owing to different risk preferences. The basic principal agent problem 
assumes that agents have a negative view and have a tendency to seek autonomy from the 
organizational rules, to minimize the burden of responsibilities and to hoard rather than 
disseminate information. Two problems stem from the principal agent problem, namely the 
moral hazard problem and the adverse selection problem. 
 
The central dilemma investigated by the principal agent theorists is how to induce the agent to 
act in the best interests of the principal when the agent has an informational advantage over the 
principal and has differing interests from the principal. Sappington (1991) provides a discussion 
of the principal agent incentive problems. Principals must therefore balance agency costs against 
costs of debt finance and costs associated with not separating ownership from control.  The 
theorists endeavor to find an optimum point of privatization where the marginal total costs 
(agency costs plus production costs) equal their marginal benefits. 
   
 
Agency costs are transaction costs reflecting the fact that without incurring these costs it is 
impossible for principals to ensure agents will act in the principal‟s interests. Agency costs 
include the costs of investigating and selecting appropriate agents, gaining information to set 
standards, monitoring agents, bonding payments by agents and residual losses. Agency costs 
have policy implications in organizations namely: 
 Information costs in contract management means that the agent has an informational 
advantage over the principal regarding performance points to the fact that a contractor 
may be able to impose high agency costs by resisting the principal‟s efforts to gain 
information. Information asymmetry in favor of the agent thus exists in all principal 
agent relationships and agents regard information as a source of power and therefore 
hoards and guards it. Waterman and Meier (1998) report that the more uncertain the 
outcomes the more the agent will have incentive to resist the principal‟s information 
gathering efforts so as to encourage behavioral rather than outcome performance 
standards. Mahler and Regan (2005) document that by reducing the costs of 
information gathering to the principal because of the internet, control of the agent and 
his outcomes became easier and more effective. 
 The goal incongruity between the principal and the agent increases the agent‟s 
incentive to withhold information from the principal (Simonsen and Hill,1995). 
 Some agents are more risk averse than others because they cannot diversify their 
employment easily. Risk averse agents are more prone to withhold information from 
principals, increasing agency costs. 
 Interdependence can also make processes more complex and uncertain, in turn 
increasing the agency costs of obtaining information. 
 The agent may not follow the intent of the principal when there is insufficient 
investment in communication channels by the principal resulting in lack of clarity and 
or consistency of messages from the principal. This results in communication costs 
(Goggin et al, 1990). 
   
Hebert Simon (1957) emphasized that agents faced with information costs in the present and 
uncertainty about the future which limits their decision making ability may be forced to make 
decisions by seeking first a satisfactory solution rather than an optimizing solution that will 
require full information. 
 
Implementing this framework in syndicated loans, the borrower (principal) pays the lead 
arranger (agent) an arrangement fee for the lead arranger to form the most favorable syndicate on 
his behalf. This involves recruiting a sufficient number of loan participants, negotiating the 
contractual details of a loan, disseminating financial documents to potential participants and 
preparing adequate loan documentation. In all these activities the lead arranger is expected to act 
in the best interests of the borrower, but since his efforts are unobservable, there is room that he 
may not always act in the best interests of the borrower. 
 
2.3.2 The Moral Hazard Problem 
Holmstrom (1979) postulates that moral hazard occurs when a party insulated from risk behaves 
differently than it would behave it were fully exposed to risk. It arises when an agent does not 
take full consequences and responsibility of its actions. Moral hazard is also a bi-product of 
information asymmetry in which one party (the agent) has more information about his actions 
and intentions than the other party (the principal) who pays for the negative consequences of 
risk. Because of information asymmetries the manager takes actions as an agent of the principal 
but the principal has little information on which to judge the effectiveness of the manager‟s 
performance.  In practice the principal relies and trusts the manager to act properly and in his 
best interests. 
Under the moral hazard problem the issue facing the principal is how to persuade an agent to act 
so as to maximize the principal‟s interests. This can be achieved by close monitoring of the agent 
to reduce information asymmetries between the principal and the agent and also by the principal 
providing incentives to the agent so as to realign their objectives. In financial markets the banks 
possess superior information about the credit quality of their loans and this gives rise to the 
   
moral hazard problem. The recent developments in the banking sector of originate-to-distribute 
model of banking exacerbates this problem (Berndt and Gupta, 2008). This model entails that the 
banks originate financial products with the primary motive of selling the products to willing 
buyers. This phenomenon is most prevalent in syndicated loans and loan sales where after 
closing the deal banks may impair their monitoring function to the potential detriment of other 
market participants. Early banking theories on information asymmetry and the need for 
monitoring by Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984) provide a background to motivate an 
empirical analysis on the issue. Diamonds (1984)‟s insights on joint monitoring apply to 
syndicated loans.  He reports that monitoring of debt obligations by multiple creditors results in 
higher costs and inefficient free riding and the creditors perceiving this, delegate the monitoring 
function to one creditor who faces incentive problems given that the benefits of monitoring apply 
to the whole syndicate loan and  not to his portion of the loan amount alone. Gerton and 
Pennachi (1995) show that in syndicated loans the lead arranger is the informed lender who is 
able to monitor and learn about the borrower through unobservable and costly effort. The 
participant lenders are the uninformed  lenders who rely on the information and monitoring 
provided by the lead arranger to make lending decisions. This information asymmetry promotes 
the moral hazard problem given that the efforts of the lead arranger are unobservable. The lead 
arranger‟s potential loss increases with the portion he retains after the syndication process and 
therefore his monitoring and due diligence effort declines as he sells more of the loan to 
syndicate participants. In the long run only reputation concerns by the lead arranger will govern 
his monitoring and due diligence if he holds none of the loan in his balance sheet. 
 
In this framework the lead arranger exerts less effort in his responsibilities than he would if his 
actions were fully observable by the participant lender. Participant lenders anticipating this 
response choose to hold less of the loan and only invest in syndicated loans after the lead 
arranger has taken a sufficient financial investment in the loan to ensure that he will honor his 
obligations. The key assumption in the moral hazard framework is that lead arrangers cannot 
commit to doing the proper due diligence because their effort is unobservable and that if his 
efforts were perfectly observable, participant lenders would compensate the lead arranger for his 
monitoring  and due diligence effort , the amount held by the lead arranger would be irrelevant. 
   
 
2.3.3 The Adverse Selection Problem 
Adverse selection refers to a market process in which bad results occur because of asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers. It arises when the principal is able to observe the agent‟s 
actions but is unable to verify whether the agent acted optimally or made the correct selection. In 
general adverse selection problems are resolved by signals which give high quality agents the 
opportunity to reveal their private information or self identity to the principal. 
 
The adverse selection problem is best described by Akerlof (1970) paper “Market for Lemons”. 
He points out that in the market place goods of different qualities exist and the owners, sellers of 
these goods know more about their goods quality than do the buyers. The potential buyers 
themselves know that the sellers know more about the quality of the goods than themselves. 
Because of this information asymmetry the market changes dramatically. He reports that in 
equilibrium goods available at a given price must be worth that price. This suggests that market 
quality is endogenous and it depends on price. When sellers have private information about a 
product‟s intrinsic worth they will only bring out good quality products into the market when 
prices are high. Buyers anticipating this behavior adjust the price they are willing to pay to 
reflect the quality of the goods they expect to buy at that price. To reverse the lemons problem 
the sellers must find a means to disclose information credibly and this is termed the Full 
Disclosure Principle, where in equilibrium all market participants will disclose their private 
information so as to signal quality. 
 
Jones et al (2005) provide the theoretical framework to test the adverse selection problem. 
Because lead arrangers are typically the larger banks, they can be expected to know more about 
the credit quality of the loans they originate than the participants. This is because of the 
substantial economies of scale in information collection and monitoring process associated with 
large commercial lending. The lead arranger‟s specialization in information collection and 
monitoring processing and loan monitoring minimizes the total cost of loan production. Lead 
   
arrangers are typically large banks with substantial reputation capital to protect, and therefore 
have greater incentive to gather and process information on borrowers. This creates information 
asymmetry between the lead arranger and the participant lenders. 
 
It is possible that lead arrangers can choose to exploit the private information that they have on 
prospective borrowers by syndicating more of the lower quality loans to participant banks as the 
participant banks are unable to verify whether they would have acted optimally in such a 
decision. To mitigate this problem Gerton and Pennachi (1995) postulate that, lead arrangers are 
interested in protecting their market reputations and may refrain from exploiting any information 
advantage for short run gains. This problem can also be mitigated by the partcipant lenders 
themselves if they had some signal about relative loan quality. In such a situation participant 
lenders sensing exploitation can decide to hold smaller loan portions forcing the lead arranger to 
strictly monitor the borrower. Participant lenders can also adjust their demand for opaque loans 
forcing the lead arranger to retain a higher loan share.  Thus although a positive relation between 
loan credit quality and retained agent loan share would indicate that agent banks exploit 
information asymmetries, a negative relation does not necessarily indicate the absence of adverse 
selection in allocating loan shares to syndicate participants. 
2.3.4 Corporate Reputations 
A corporate reputation is a collective representation of a company‟s past actions and future 
prospects that describe how key resource providers interpret a company‟s initiatives and assess 
its ability to deliver valued outcomes. Weiglet and Camerer (1988) define corporate reputation as 
a set of attributes ascribed to a firm, inferred from the firm‟s past actions. Corporate reputations 
are intangible economic assets that contribute to the competitive advantage of a company. 
Reputations are externally perceived and are largely outside the direct control of firm‟s 
managers. Barney (1991) reports that reputations impede mobility and produce returns to firms 
because they are difficult to imitate. Reputations matter because they create value by attracting 
more and better resources to better regarded companies. 
 
   
Formbrun (1996) reports that reputation markets show tendencies of winner-take-all 
environments in which few companies come out on top and most others lose. Disproportionate 
visibility and attention accrue to winners because of the bandwagon process that exaggerate 
minor differences in performance and fuel imitation. Bandwagons are developed as slight 
differences between companies induce companies to advertise their superiority increasing their 
familiarity and reputation. Dobson (1993) investigated the extent to which the agency problems 
of moral hazard and adverse selection are ameliorated by an agent‟s desire to build and maintain 
reputations in a multi-period environment. He reports that contractual environments 
characterized by the moral hazard problem, reputation can act as a contractual enforcement 
mechanism while in contractual environments characterized by the adverse selection problem 
reputation can actually compound the agency problem. These findings suggest that caution 
should be exercised when relying on an agent‟s reputation to enforce a contract. 
 
Favorable reputations can generate excess returns for firms by inhibiting mobility of rivals in an 
industry (Caves and Porter (1977). Klein and Loffler (1981) document that favorable reputations 
may enable firms to charge premium prices and enhance their access to capital markets (Beatty 
and Ritter (1986). Dowling (1986) shows that corporate audiences routinely rely on the 
reputations of firms in making investment decisions, career decisions and product choices. 
 
Boot et al (1993) studied why financial contracts often allow participants a measure of discretion 
as to whether to honor or repudiate them. In most instances financial institutions will honor such 
contracts because of reputation concerns. The better an institution‟s reputation, the more the 
market will be willing to pay for its guarantees. He reports that discretionary contracts provide 
institutions with additional degrees of freedom by allowing the institution to either honor them or 
repudiate them in managing its assets. These contracts also monetize reputation capital by 
allowing for adjustments on a firm‟s reputation capital. They also facilitate reputation 
enhancement through repeated honoring of these contracts. 
 
   
Gopalan et al (2008) provides a theoretical framework to test the reputation hypothesis. 
Participants in the loan syndications delegate monitoring and screening responsibilities to the 
lead arranger and this can lead to information and agency problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. A non-contractual mechanism that can mitigate the agency problem is the lead 
arranger‟s concern for his reputation in the loan syndications market. This is because the loan 
syndications market is that of repeat business between the lead arranger and the participants, the 
participants who possess long organizational memories. This gives the lead arrangers incentive 
to develop and maintain a reputation for quality in performing due diligence and monitoring. 
Uncertainty about a lead arranger‟s ability and willingness to monitor and screen borrowers can 
result in the loss of reputation by the lead arranger in the market. Such a loss in reputation could 
negatively affect the lead arranger‟s ability to attract participants and syndicate loans in the 
future. 
A loss in reputation should result ceteris paribus in severe agency problems and to mitigate this 
the lead arranger should signal to other participants his commitment to monitoring and screening 
by retaining a higher portion of the loan. Following a loss of reputation a lead arranger is 
expected to switch to more transparent borrowers who require less screening and monitoring as 
these borrowers have fewer information asymmetries. 
 
Diamond (1991) model of reputation acquisition also provides a theoretical framework to test the 
reputation hypothesis. Diamond (1991) postulates that borrowers move from private sources of 
funding such as relationship bank loans to public debt by establishing a solid credit reputation 
through repaying loans. Monitoring becomes unnecessary as the borrower‟s reputation improves 
and thus the borrower no longer relies on commercial bank for funds. In this model borrowers 
with little or no credit reputation obtain loans that are similar to sole lender loans with the lead 
arrangers retaining a substantial portion of the loan and fewer participant lenders in the 
syndicate. A heavily concentrated syndicate is thus formed. Reputable borrowers on the other 
hand obtain loans that are similar to public debt with the lead arranger retaining a smaller share 
of the loan. The syndicate is dispersed because reputable borrowers have no problems attracting 
participant lenders. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.1 Data 
The primary data source used to evaluate loan syndications is from two banks who prefer to 
remain anonymous. The data from these two banks shows comprehensive information on the 
deals they participated in both at partcicipant and lead arranger level. This information includes 
the total loan amount, number of participants and their respective shares of the loan, interest rates 
charged clearly showing the margin over benchmark, tenor of the loan, lead arranger‟s fee and 
other upfront fees charged to the borrower. Access to the term sheets and syndicate loan 
agreements was also given for every transaction these two banks participated in. As the South 
African syndicated loans market has few market players the likelihood of these two institutions 
participating in similar transactions is very high, therefore care was given to remove duplicate 
transactions from the sample.  
 
   
Another source of data used in this research was the Export Credit Insurance Company of South 
Africa (ECIC). ECIC provides insurance cover on risks associated with investments and loan 
finance for capital goods and services projects in foreign countries. The cover is offered to 
financial institutions who provide loans for overseas enterprises and projects against political 
risks. It provides insurance against default on a loan payment where the direct cause of default is 
due to political events as listed under insurance coverage. Thus all South African domiciled 
financial institutions that participate in syndicated loans abroad make use of this facility to cover 
themselves against political risk. ECIC provides a list of all transactions it has insured since its 
inception. It also provides country ratings based on risk. The information provided shows the 
insured party, the amount insured, the borrower, industry, the project being undertaken and the 
country of the borrower. Due care is also undertaken to eliminate deals already reported in the 
sample provided by the two anonymous banks. The media and internet provides coverage on 
almost all syndicated loan via their coverage of signing on ceremonies. At these ceremonies 
information on the total loan amount, participants and their shares, lead arrangers, co- lead 
arranger and tenor of the loan is disclosed. Transactions that were not covered by the media and 
internet were dropped from the sample because of insufficient information. Another source of 
information from the internet was the Dealogic website which keeps a database of all global 
loans. 
 
Another source of data was the tombstones provided by banks usually at the end of each year. 
Banks use tombstones as marketing tools to signal to the market their experience and growth via 
transactions that they have participated in during the year. Typical tombstones show the 
borrower, loan amount and the bank‟s role in the transaction. Repeating the procedure outlined 
above for the ECIC, deals already captured in the sample are dropped. Using the internet and 
media resources, information obtained from the signing on ceremonies is incorporated in the 
sample and transactions where there is inadequate information are dropped from the sample. The 
resulting sample shows that banks repeatedly interact with each other in most transactions 
especially those where the borrower is domiciled in South Africa. For borrowers that are not 
domiciled in South Africa other regional players come into play in partnership with the 
developmental institutions such as Development Bank of Southern Africa, International Finance 
   
Corporation and Development Bank of Africa. From an initial sample size of 112 syndicated 
loans, a final sample size of 68 syndicated loans is obtained from 1990 to 2010. Most of the 
transactions are concentrated in the period after year 2000. A total of 157 lenders participated in 
these loans. Some syndicated loans have more than one loan tranche and following Sufi (2007), a 
deal level analysis is employed to calculate the number of lenders and the amounts held by each 
lender. To ease the analysis, all loan amounts were converted into one currency, the United 
States dollar using the average exchange rate for the year 2010. According to INet Bridge the 
2010 average was R7.43/$. 
 
This paper also analyses how information asymmetries influence the type of participants in the 
syndicate. To facilitate this information on the lenders location is extracted. Part of the analysis 
presented in this paper focuses on the reputations of the lead arrangers and the borrowers. For the 
lenders experience in specific transactions is employed as a proxy for reputation. For the 
borrowers, data is collected on their firm characteristics. Information on the financial position of 
the borrower, industry, perceived market share, location and total assets is obtained from the 
financial press and the internet. The borrower‟s market share is employed as a proxy for 
reputation. 
   
3.2 Methodology 
The major part of the analysis presented in this paper focuses on the effects of information 
asymmetries and the resulting agency problems on the structure of the syndicated loans. The 
information asymmetries are in two forms namely, between the lead arranger and other syndicate 
members and between the borrower and syndicate members. Specifically the effect of 
information asymmetries on the lead arranger‟s retention ratio, the number of participants, the 
type of participants and the margin charged to the borrower is explored. To this end borrowing 
firms are classified as either opaque or transparent. Opaque firms are generally associated with 
severe information asymmetries and higher possibilities of agency problems while transparent 
firms are associated with little information asymmetries and agency problems. 
   
 
To classify the borrower‟s as opaque or transparent a variety of measures are employed. 
Following Bosch (2006)‟s reasoning, publicly listed companies can be regarded as more 
transparent than unlisted companies because of the regulatory requirements governing reporting. 
This reduces the levels of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Another 
useful indicator of transparency is articulated by Gadanecz et al (2010). They suggest that the 
availability of credit ratings on a borrower is a useful a measure of transparency on a borrowing 
firm. The attainment of a good credit rating by a borrower reduces the information asymmetries 
between the borrower and lenders. This is because the providers of this information (rating 
agencies) have concerns about their own reputations and therefore do not certify inferior 
borrowers with good credit ratings. Country ratings are also employed as a measure of 
transparency. Country ratings cover political, economic, social and legal aspects of a country and 
thus can be useful in classifying borrowers into opaque and transparent. Although audited 
financial statements are available for the less transparent (opaque) borrowers, the assumption is 
that participant lenders are more dependent on the lead arranger for both its monitoring skills and 
its ability to collect detailed information when the borrowing firm is not publicly listed. 
 
3.2.1 Information Asymmetry and Syndicate Structure 
An analysis is undertaken to examine how information asymmetries and the resulting agency 
problems affect the structure of the syndicate with special emphasis on the share retained by the 
lead arranger. The analysis explores whether syndicated loans to transparent borrowers who 
generally require less monitoring and due diligence than opaque borrowers result in the lead 
arranger retaining a smaller share of the loan. Transparency mitigates the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problem for the lead arranger as he does not have to retain a bigger share of the 
loan to signify his commitment to due diligence and monitoring. An analysis is also undertaken 
to ascertain the share of a syndicated loan retained by the lead arranger when the loan is 
extended to an opaque borrower. This analysis follows the theory developed by Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) where for opaque borrowers the lead arranger has to signify his commitment to 
monitoring and due diligence by holding a larger share of the loan. 
   
 
The lead arranger‟s experience in similar transactions is employed as a measure of the 
information asymmetries between the lead arranger and the participant lenders. Employing 
experience as a measure of the information asymmetries between lenders is appropriate because 
as a bank is repeatedly exposed to similar transactions knowledge of the most intricate details of 
a transaction is gained. The other participant lenders can expect superior due diligence and 
monitoring from that lender reducing the moral hazard and adverse selection problem. To 
implement this, the borrower‟s areas of operations are divided into sectors namely 
Telecommunications, Energy, Transport, Mining and Water Infrustructure Development. The 
lenders are then sorted by experience in all the sectors highlighted above. 
 
Using the above described methodology the effect of information asymmetries between lenders 
can be analyzed. The analysis determines the effect of a lead arranger‟s experience on the portion 
of the loan he retains after syndication. It ascertains whether a lead arranger with limited 
experience in certain transactions is forced to retain a larger share of the loan so as to signal his 
commitment to due diligence and monitoring. The analysis determines if the hypothesis is true 
for the experienced lead arranger in that he may not need to retain a higher stake of the loan as 
the other lenders may assume that he possesses  superior monitoring and due diligence skills in 
that area. The Herfindahl index is calculated as a measure of the concentration of holdings a 
syndicate. It is calculated using each syndicate member‟s share in the loan and it is the sum of 
the squared individual shares in the loan, varying from zero to 10 000 with 10 000 being the 
Herfindahl when a lender holds 100% of the loan. 
 
3.2.2 Information Asymmetry and Number of Participants. 
The above outlined methodology of classifying borrowers into “opaque” or “transparent” is also 
employed to analyze the how information asymmetries affect the number of participants. 
Syndicated loans being a hybrid of public and private debt, the lead arranger first establishes a 
relationship with the borrower then sells part of the loan to willing buyers. Borrower information 
   
asymmetries can influence the saleability of the loan to other lenders as the other lenders may 
perceive the risk to be too high. The analysis determines if opaque borrowers attract fewer 
participant lenders than transparent borrowers resulting in a concentrated syndicate. In the same 
vein the analysis determines if an inexperienced lead arranger in a certain sector may find it 
difficult to attract participant lenders than an experienced lead arranger as other lenders may be 
uncertain about his monitoring and due diligence efforts. An inexperienced lead arranger may 
thus form a more concentrated syndicate than that of an experienced lead arranger. 
 
3.2.3 Information Asymmetry and  Participant Choice. 
Classifying borrowers as transparent or opaque and lenders as experienced or inexperienced, an 
analysis is made to determine the effect of information asymmetries on the participant lenders 
that end up as syndicate members. First the analysis examines whether lead arrangers select 
potential participants that are more familiar with the borrowing firm when information 
asymmetry problems are potentially severe. Focus is on the characteristics of the lenders given 
that the lenders are approached by the lead arranger and how these characteristics vary with the 
opacity of the borrower. The hypothesis is that opaque borrowers find it difficult to attract 
participant lenders and the lead arranger anticipating this may approach lenders who are closer to 
the borrower geographically and in terms of previous relationships Sufi (2007) so as to minimize 
the costs of information gathering on the part of participant lenders. For inexperienced lead 
arrangers they may try to augment their limitations by bringing on board an experienced lender 
as co- lead arranger. By appointing a co-lead arranger an inexperienced lead arranger can tap into 
the co-lead arranger‟s expertise especially on due diligence thus enhancing his own experience in 
the process. An experienced lead arranger may on the other hand not need the services of a co-
lead arranger and thus forms a syndicate with ordinary participants only. 
 
3.2.4 Information Asymmetries and the Loan Margin. 
The impact of information asymmetries on the margins charged to the borrower is determined 
using the above methodology. Focus is on the information asymmetries between the borrower 
   
and the participant lenders and how these affect the margin that participant lenders require to 
extend funds to the borrower. Opaque borrowers have a higher perceived risk than transparent 
borrowers and lenders require a higher margin on such loans. Considering that there is only one 
term sheet during the syndication which requires a unanimous decision, if some of the loan 
participants perceive the information asymmetries between them and the borrower to be high, 
they may press for a higher margin. On the part of inexperienced lenders other participant 
lenders may not be confident of the monitoring and due diligence effort of the inexperienced 
lender and can require a higher margin for their funds. 
3.2.5 Reputation and Information Asymmetry Mitigation 
As highlighted above part of the analysis presented in this paper is to determine whether the 
reputation of the borrower mitigates the information asymmetries in syndicated loans. As already 
discussed above, when a borrower requires more investigation and monitoring effort, the lead 
arranger retains a larger stake of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate. Taking into 
account the fact that the syndicated loans market is one of repeated interactions, borrowers 
become more known to potential participants as they repeatedly access the market and thus the 
theory predicts that lead arrangers should hold less of the loan when a borrower develops a 
reputation in the market of timeous repayment. Classifying the lead arrangers as “experienced” 
and “inexperienced” based on whether the lead arranger has led a similar transaction in the same 
sector this paper determines if the lead arranger‟s reputation can mitigate information 
asymmetries. Using the borrower‟s market share to classify borrowers as “reputable” and “not 
reputable” this paper analyses if the borrower‟s reputation can mitigate the information 
asymmetries in syndicated loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 Analysis and Results 
Figure 5, 6 and 7 diagrammatically shows the summary statistics for the 68 loans under analysis. 
The summary statistics are based on the actual figures of the loans under analysis. 
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Figure 5 : Active Countries in Syndicated Loans 
Figure 5 shows the country of origin of borrowers who seek syndicated loans from the South 
African lenders. Countries that are going through rapid economic development are the top 
   
receipiants of the syndicated loans with the exception of South Africa. Countries such as Angola, 
DRC and Mozambique  present great opportunities for loan syndications as there is a strong need 
for infrastructure development and project financing after prolonged periods of political 
instability. In this analysis Angola, DRC and Mozambique received 43% of the syndicated loans 
under analysis. These countries are also popular with lenders because of the higher margins that 
are charged on the loans due to higher country risk. 
 
 
 
 
Active Sectors
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
tra
ns
po
rt
M
in
in
g 
w
at
er
 a
nd
 S
an
ita
tio
n
In
fru
st
ru
ct
ur
e
E
ne
rg
y
IC
T
Le
is
ur
e
O
th
er
Number of Deals
 
Figure 6: Active Economic Sectors in Loan Syndications. 
Figure 6 shows the sectors of the economy that actively seek syndicated funding. In recent years 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector has been the major recipient of 
syndicated loans as countries try to keep up with the ever-changing telecommunications sector. 
Transport and energy sectors are also popular as countries try to meet the demands of growing 
economies. 
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Figure 7: Syndicated Loan Purpose 
 
Figure 7 shows the common purposes of the syndicated loans raised by South African banks. 
Project finance accounts for almost half of the loans raised signifying development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. 
 
Table I  
Summary Statistics for Syndicated Loan Deals 
This table presents the summary statistics of the syndicated loans. These summary statistics are 
calculated as averages of the 68 syndicated loans under analysis and are calculated at deal level. 
    Distribution   
 
No of 
Deals Mean SD 10th 50
th
 90th 
Syndicated loan characteristics       
Size of Deal (US$ Millions) 68 117 287 25.5 90 300 
Tenor (Years) 68 2.00 0.65 1 1.75 2.25 
Margin Over LIBOR (basis 68 436 139 225 375 665 
   
    Distribution   
 
No of 
Deals Mean SD 10th 50
th
 90th 
Points) 
       
Syndicate Structure       
Number of lenders 68 5.6 2.8 2 5 11 
Number of Lead Arrangers 68 1.8 2.1 1 2 3 
Number of Participant Lenders 68 3.8 1.8 1 3 8 
% of Loan Retained by Lead 
Arranger 68 29.87 8.7 14.6 26.75 65.8 
Concentration of Syndicate 
(Herfindahl) 68 2658 1.274 985 2265 5897 
       
 
The loan characteristics in Table I show that the average loan is $117 million with a tenor of two 
years at a rate of 436 basis points above LIBOR. The average syndicated loan has 5.6 lenders, 
1.8 lead arrangers and 3.8 participant lenders. On average the lead arranger retains 29.87% of the 
loan and using the Herfindahl index measure of concentration of holdings within a syndicate, the 
average value is 2658. The Herfindahl index is the sum of squares of the shares held by each 
lender in the syndicate. The index can range from 0 to 10000 and a Herfindahl index value of 
10000 means the lead arranger holds 100% of the loan. The distribution of the syndicated loans 
is dispersed as evidenced by the wide range between the 10
th
 percentile figures and the 90
th
 
percentile figures. The actual loan figures range from $15 million to $965 million. This pattern is 
true even for the syndicate structure. The total number of lenders in this sample ranges from 2 
lenders to 11 lenders. A wide range is also clear in the analysis of the syndicate concentration 
with the degree of concentration ranging from 10.5% (1
st
 percentile) to 72.68% (99
th
 percentile). 
 
Table II 
   
Top Lead Arrangers and Participant banks, by Number of Deals 
Table II ranks the lead arrangers and the top ten participants by the total number of deals for the 
68 syndicated loans under analysis. 
Lead Arrangers  Most Common Participant  
    
Bank 
Total No of 
deals Bank  
Total No of 
Deals 
Standard Bank South Africa 15 World Bank 26 
Nedbank 12 African Development Bank 21 
ABSA 10 Standard Bank South Africa 19 
Rand Merchant Bank 8 
International Finance 
Corporation 17 
Development Bank of Southern 
Africa 7 ABSA 14 
International Finance Corporation 5 
Industrial Development 
Corporation 9 
African Development Bank 4 European Investment Bank 9 
World Bank 4 
Development Bank Of Southern 
Africa 8 
Standard Chartered South Africa 2 Nedbank 8 
Citibank 1 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Services 7 
   
 
 
The sample results on the top ten lead arrangers and participants shows the dominance of the 
“Big Four” South African banks in the loan syndications market. Standard Bank with its 
presence in 17 African countries is able to capitalize on its network is the top lead arranger. Its 
dominance is also felt as it also appears on the top five participants list. Global development 
institutions appear to dominate the participant lenders list signifying their commitment to the 
development of the African continent. 
   
 
Table III presents the means for the transparent and opaque borrowers. The opaque borrowers 
account for 67% of the syndicated loans. This result is robust given the fact that most of the 
funds raised are for borrowers domiciled in Africa where most of the borrowers have no credit 
ratings and their country ratings are poor. Opaque borrowers obtain smaller loans with shorter 
tenors and at a higher margin than the transparent borrowers. In terms of the syndicate structure 
transparent borrowers have larger numbers of lenders, lead arrangers and participant lenders than 
the opaque borrowers. The lead arranger retains a smaller percentage of the loan (24%) 
compared to (39%) for the opaque borrowers. The transparent borrowers syndicate is less 
concentrated than that of the opaque borrowers as by shown by a lower Herfindahl figure (2146 
compared to 3346).  These figures suggest that lead arrangers retain a larger share of the loan and 
form a more concentrated syndicate with fewer participants when borrowers are opaque. The 
results outlined in Table III are consistent with the theoretical framework of agency and moral 
hazard outlined in chapter two. Opaque firms are more difficult to investigate and monitor, 
which exacerbates the moral hazard problem for the lead arranger. Participant lenders are more 
reliant on the monitoring and investigation efforts of the lead arranger for loans to opaque 
borrowers, exacerbating the moral hazard problem. This induces the lead arranger to retain a 
larger share of the loan in order to attract uninformed capital from participant lenders. The results 
in Table III are consistent with moral hazard in a setting of information asymmetry as reported 
by Bosch and Steffen (2006), Sufi (2007) and Jones et al (2008). 
Table III 
Information Asymmetries and Syndicate Structure 
Table III presents the means by group for the sample of 68 loans under analysis. An “opaque” 
firm is a firm that requires intense monitoring and due diligence as it is not publicly listed, has no 
credit rating and it country rating is poor. A “transparent” firm is a firm that requires less 
monitoring and due diligence as it is publicly listed, has a good credit rating and country rating. 
   
 Opaque Borrowers Transparent 
   
Borrowers 
Loan Characteristics   
Percentage of Sample Loans 0.67 0.33 
Loan Size (US$ Millions) 245 294 
Tenor (Years) 2 3.25 
Margin over LIBOR (basis 
points) 565 325 
   
Syndicate Structure 
Characteristics   
Number of Lenders 4.85 6.45 
Number of Lead Arrangers 1.3 2.15 
Number of participant banks 3.55 4.3 
% of loan retained by Lead 
Arranger 38.58 23.67 
Concentration of Syndicate 3346 2146 
   
Table IV 
Information Asymmetries and the Lead Arranger Reputation 
Table IV measures the impact of the lead arranger‟s reputation on the information asymmetries 
using previous experience as a proxy for reputation. The figures presented are means when the 
lead arrangers are classified as “experienced” and “inexperienced”. 
   
 
Experienced 
Lenders 
Inexperienced 
Lenders 
Deal Characteristics   
Number of Lenders 7.35 5.26 
Number of Lead Arrangers 1.68 2.14 
Number of Participant Banks 5.67 3.12 
   
% of Loan Retained by Lead 
Arranger 28.94 29.32 
Concentration of Syndicate 2356 3487 
Margin over LIBOR (basis 
points) 368 387 
 
 
The theoretical framework discussed in this paper predicts that when the borrowing firm requires 
more intense investigation and monitoring, the lead arranger retains a larger portion of the loan 
as a signal to the participant lenders of his commitment to costly effort. A characteristic of the 
syndicated loans market is repeat interactions amongst lenders which leads to reputation 
building. It can therefore be anticipated that reputable lead arrangers can overcome moral hazard 
concerns without retaining a larger share of the loan. Based on the analysis of the 68 syndicated 
loans the results show no significant differences in the retention ratios of the experienced and 
inexperienced (28.94% compared to 29.32%). The syndicates formed by the experienced lead 
arrangers have a higher number of participant lenders than the inexperienced lead arrangers (5.67 
compared to 3.12). The syndicates are also less concentrated than those of the inexperienced 
lenders. 
 
These results suggest that in South Africa and Sub Saharan Africa the reputation of the lead 
arranger is useful in attracting participants rather than ameliorating information asymmetries. 
This result is consistent with Gopalan (2008) where the loss of reputation by a lead arranger 
reduces his ability to attract syndicate participants and syndicate loans. Another explanation for 
the higher number of participants in the syndicates formed by reputable lead is given by Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004). They suggest that reputable lead arrangers form larger and more diffuse 
syndicates because reputation formation and maintenance requires a large network of contacts 
and frequent repeat business.   Inexperienced lenders on the other hand have a higher number of 
lead arrangers in their structure. This result is consistent with the findings of Francois and 
Missionier- Piera (2007) who attribute the presence of co-lead arrangers as support for the 
   
specialization hypothesis where multiple co-arrangers are employed because of their different 
competitive advantages in performing special tasks. Inexperienced lead arrangers may also be 
employing the services of experienced lenders as co-lead arrangers so as to capitalize on their 
knowledge and expertise in certain transactions. Through a series of contractual obligations the 
South African and Sub Saharan Africa syndicated loans market is able to ameliorate the 
problems of information asymmetries. It is standard in almost all the loans under analysis that 
independent experts in the form of accountants, lawyers and engineers are consulted on the loans 
at the expense of the borrower. These experts have concerns about their reputations and are 
expected to give a fair assessment on the loans and this reduces the information asymmetries 
between the lenders. It is also common that participant lenders are asked to sign an indemnity 
form that indemnifies the lead arranger from any form of litigation in the form of adverse 
selection. This encourages the participant lenders to conduct their own due diligence on the 
borrower. All syndicated loans are based on one term sheet for all lenders. This aids in 
ameliorating the agency problems especially the adverse selection problem as consensus on all 
loan terms is required before the signing off.  
Table V 
Information Asymmetries and Borrower reputation 
Table V measures the impact of the borrower‟s reputation on the information asymmetries using 
the borrower‟s market share in its industry of operation as a proxy for reputation. Following 
Formbrun (1996), where he reports that reputation markets show tendencies of winner-take-all 
environments in which few companies come out on top and most others lose, this analysis 
employs a minimum of 30% industry market share as a proxy for reputation. 
 Reputable  Not Reputable  
Deal Characteristics   
Number of Lenders 5.78 5.43 
Number of Lead Arrangers 1.64 1.89 
Number of Participant Banks 4.14 3.54 
% of Loan Retained by Lead 
Arranger 28.86 29.61 
   
Concentration of Syndicate 2432 2614 
Margin over LIBOR (basis 
points) 387 538 
  
 
 
The results above suggest that the reputation of the borrower does not ameliorate the information 
asymmetries in the South African and Sub Saharan Africa loan syndications market. This is 
because the results show no difference in the structure of the syndicates formed for reputable 
borrowers and borrowers who are not reputable. The only difference noted is in the margin 
charged the reputable borrowers compared to the margin charged borrowers who are not 
reputable. This result is consistent with the findings of Bosch (2006) where reputable transparent 
borrowers are charged lower margins than opaque borrowers because investors demand a risk 
premium to hold securities with higher information asymmetries. Reputable borrowers are 
charged a significantly lower margin than that charged to borrowers with no reputation. This 
suggests that borrower reputation only aids in improving the borrower‟s credit risk. It would 
however be interesting to note the results had borrower‟s previous lending history had been 
employed as a proxy for reputation. This was however not possible in this sample analysis as for 
most borrowers no history was available.  
 
4.2 Moral Hazard Versus Adverse Selection. 
The following discussion tries to distinguish from the results presented above between the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problem and to find out which of the two problems is prevalent.  
The key distinction in the adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses is the assumption of 
where the information asymmetry originates from. In the adverse selection hypothesis the lead 
arranger has private information on the borrower that the other participant lenders do not have. In 
the moral hazard hypothesis, all lenders are unfamiliar with the borrower and the moral hazard 
problem is most severe when the lead arranger must learn about the firm.  The results above can 
be interpreted as predominantly moral hazard with respect to lead arranger effort in monitoring 
and investigation. This paper‟s intuition is that, had the adverse selection problem been dominant 
then the results for the reputable borrowers would have shown lead arrangers retaining a smaller 
   
fraction of the loan and forming a less concentrated syndicate than that of the less reputable 
borrowers. This result however is not conclusive as the analysis employed the borrower‟s market 
share as a proxy for reputation due to data limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
   
Syndicated lending represents an important source of funding in South Africa. Companies are 
increasingly turning to loan syndications to fund their operations because of their flexibility and 
convenience. This report provided an in-depth analysis of the South African loan syndications 
market. The South African syndicated loans market dominated by commercial banks and 
development agencies who aid borrowers in raising large amounts for money for various 
corporate purposes. The common reason for accessing syndicated loans in South Africa is for 
project and trade financing. The sample shows that the major sectors of the economy that 
syndicated loans are raised for are energy, transport, mining, water sanitation and 
telecommunications. The lenders exhibit bias towards participating certain sectors of the 
economy while avoiding other sectors. This is attributed to internal company strategies and 
mandates. For example DBSA does not participate in projects that manufacture weapons of war 
and that do not result in the creation of jobs for the masses because of its developmental 
mandate.  
The primary objective of this paper was to analyze the effect of information asymmetries on the 
syndicate structure. Consistent with Sufi (2007) the results show that information asymmetries as 
shown by the borrower‟s level of transparency affect the structure of the syndicate. The lead 
arranger‟s retention ratio determines the structure of the syndicate. It follows that if a lead 
arranger retains a higher stake in the loan then the resulting syndicate will be concentrated as a 
smaller part of the loan will be open for syndication. The results show that lead arrangers in 
South Africa on average retain 30% of the loan amount, though this figure can be adjusted to suit 
the circumstances surrounding the loan. The retention ratio of the loan is used to address the 
moral hazard problem in loan syndications in South Africa. Consistent with Gerton and Pennachi 
(1995) participants in the loan syndications appear to commit to funding a loan only after the 
lead arranger has signaled his commitment to due diligence and monitoring by an appropriate 
retention ratio. The retention ratio is adjusted appropriately depending on the lead arranger. The 
results show that loans with longer tenors that are arranged by commercial banks have lower 
retention ratios than those arranged by development banks. This is attributed the fact that 
commercial banks obtain most of their funding from short term deposits and in an effort to match 
their assets and liabilities they cannot heavily commit to long term loan. This is contrary to the 
assertion that lead arrangers may retain lower portions of unfavorable loans. Development banks 
   
on the other hand are funded by long term funds and therefore are able to commit to loans with 
longer tenors. 
The South African and Sub Saharan Africa syndicated loans market uses experience as a proxy 
for reputation as most participants show bias towards participating in certain sectors of the 
economy. The results show that when the lead arranger is reputable, the moral hazard problem is 
reduced as they do not have to signify their commitment to due diligence and monitoring by 
retaining a higher portion of the loan. Less reputable lead arrangers retain a higher portion of the 
loan in an effort to signify their commitment to due diligence and monitoring. In an effort to 
enhance reputations, lead arrangers that are not reputable appoint co-lead arrangers who are 
reputable in that sector so as to benefit from their experience. Even when the mandated lead 
arranger has no funding limitations, the presence of an experienced co-lead arranger is an 
enhancement strategy especially when the size of the transaction is large. 
 
Part of the analysis presented in this paper analyzed the effect of information asymmetries in the 
number of participants willing to take part in the loan. The results show that the credit quality of 
the borrower (as represented by the borrower‟s level of transparency) affects the number of 
participants willing to take part in the loan. This is because of the perceived risk of opaque 
borrowers and this is heightened when the borrower‟s country risk is high. Borrowers from war 
torn countries and countries with no legal framework in place such as DRC attract fewer 
participants than borrowers from peaceful countries. In this way country risk be comes an 
important consideration for lenders even in the presence of export credit risk insurance. The 
results also show that the credibility of the lead arranger is also an important determinant of the 
number of participants willing to work with the lead arranger. The South African loan 
syndications market places high value on the experience of the lead arranger. Inexperienced lead 
arrangers find it difficult to attract participants because most of the participants though they are 
supposed to conduct their own due diligence they rely heavily on the lead arranger‟s due 
diligence, which in the case of inexperienced lead arrangers is questionable. This is the reason 
why co-lead arrangers are prevalent in the South African loan syndications market as it allows 
lead arrangers to compliment each other‟s experience in due diligence and monitoring. 
   
 
To a lesser extent the number of participants willing to participate in a loan is influenced by the 
sector of the economy for which the loan is being raised. Over time there are some sectors that 
are considered as “hot” and these attract interest among the lenders. Projects on toll roads, tolled 
railway lines, tolled bridges, power generation and telecommunication cables are highly favored 
by lenders and attract a lot of interest. In contrast projects to finance weapons of war and 
launching satellites are not favored by many lenders and as expected they attract fewer 
participants. In light of the recent global financial crisis banks are now more aware of their risks 
and hence bigger projects generally have more syndicate participants as the lead arrangers make 
use of their network of international banks.    
 
Contrary to the findings of Sufi (2007) this paper finds no evidence of information asymmetries 
influencing the type of lenders. Sufi (2007) reports that where information asymmetries are 
severe, the lead arranger approaches the lenders who know the borrower through previous 
interactions or through their close proximity with each other. This is done so as to reduce the 
costs of information gathering.  South African lenders generally prefer rand denominated loans 
to United States dollar denominated loans a fact this report attributes to the exchange rate risk. 
Likewise other lenders outside of South Africa prefer United States dollar denominated loans to 
rand denominated loans. This paper finds evidence that the tenor of the loan affects the type of 
participants willing to participate in the loan. As discussed above commercial banks because of 
their source of funding are not willing to finance long term loans, thus loans with longer tenors 
are taken up by development institutions mostly while loans with shorter tenors are taken up by 
commercial banks. 
 
This paper also made an analysis of the effect of information asymmetries on the margin charged 
to the borrower. All South African Syndicated loans are priced at JIBAR or LIBOR as the base 
rate and a margin is added on top of the base rate to signify the risk premium. This paper finds 
strong evidence that the margin charged to the borrower is based on the borrower‟s transparency 
with the borrower‟s reputation and country risk playing an important role. Opaque borrowers are 
   
charged higher margins than transparent borrowers. Opaque borrowers are also charged higher 
upfront fees which are recovered immediately than transparent borrowers. 
 
The second part of the analysis presented in this paper was to determine if the reputations of the 
lead arrangers and the borrower mitigate the information asymmetries that are inherent in 
syndicated loans. This paper finds no evidence that the reputation of the lead arranger can be 
used to mitigate information asymmetries. Instead the reputation of the lead arranger is useful in 
attracting syndicate participants. The reputation of the borrower improves his credit quality but 
does not mitigate the information asymmetries.  
5.2 Limitations of the Study 
This report was limited by the unavailability of a centralized database of loan syndications in 
South Africa. Though many transactions, far more than the 68 transactions used in this report 
have occurred in South Africa many could not be used due to incomplete information. This 
resulted in this report relying heavily on the information provided by the two anonymous banks 
and the media. Though these banks are major players in the South African loan syndications 
market and their deals can be representative of the loan syndications market a more 
comprehensive analysis would have been desirable if information from all banks was obtainable. 
The participant banks‟ willingness to discuss the loan syndications market was low especially on 
the sensitive issue of the pricing structure of syndicated loans. A development of an association 
like the Loan Markets Association of London will be a welcome development in South Africa as 
it will simplify the data collection process. 
 
Secondly, the use of credit ratings and public listings as a measure of transparency has its 
drawbacks as these measures are strongly related with the size of the firm which may ultimately 
impact the structure of the syndicates. Thirdly, the use of the borrower‟s market share as a proxy 
for reputation may not be appropriate as big companies can also default on their debt obligations. 
Its use was however due to lack of borrower‟s credit history.   
 
   
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
This research shed light on loan syndications in South Africa and is an initial step to other 
possible avenues of research on syndicated loans. Another area of interest could be exploring if 
the growth of syndicated loans in South Africa has resulted in a lower cost of capital for the 
borrowers. Other studies could explore the intricate relationships with both local and foreign 
banks that the syndicated loans participants possess and how these influence the market. 
Following a study by Tereza Tykvova (2007) “Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and 
Reputation” it will be interesting to analyze how such a study plays out in South Africa.  
 
 
5.4 Overall Conclusions 
This report set out to study the impact of information asymmetries on the structure of syndicated 
loans. Strong evidence was found that information asymmetries influence the lead arranger‟s 
retention ration with the lead arranger retaining a higher percentage for loans with severe 
information asymmetries. The results also show that opaque borrowers attract fewer participants 
for their loans and this concedes with the notion that information asymmetries affect the structure 
of syndicated loans in terms of the number of participants in the syndicate. This report however 
finds weak support for the notion that information asymmetries affect syndicate structures in 
terms of the type of participants. It is clear from the analysis that the type of participants is 
influenced by the tenor of the loan. Development institutions are comfortable with long term 
loans while commercial banks prefer short term loans. Rand denominated loans are mainly 
covered by South African domiciled banks while foreign currency denominated loans appear to 
attract the interest of foreign banks. Similar to traditional bank loans opaque borrowers are 
charged higher margins than transparent borrowers and in the case of syndicated loans the 
margins are even higher for borrowers domiciled in politically unstable countries. On the issue of 
reputations mitigating the agency problems in syndicated loans, this report finds weak support of 
this. Rather reputation, especially of the lead arranger, is important in attracting syndicate 
participants.  
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